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Stock Market Booms and Monetary Policy
in the Twentieth Century
Michael D. Bordo and David C. Wheelock
This article examines the association between stock market booms and monetary policy in the
United States and nine other developed countries during the 20th century. The authors find, as
was true of the U.S. stock market boom of 1994-2000, that booms typically arose during periods
of above-average growth of real output and below-average inflation, suggesting that booms reflected
both real macroeconomic phenomena and monetary policy. They find little evidence that booms
were fueled by excessive liquidity. Booms often ended within a few months of an increase in
inflation and consequent monetary policy tightening. They find few differences across the different
monetary policy regimes of the century. (JEL E300, E520, G180, N100, N200)
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growth, which many observers hailed as evidence
of a “New Economy” that justified rapid apprecia-
tion of equity prices. The period was also marked
by low and stable inflation, which may have con-
tributed to the boom by foreshadowing strong
growth of economic activity and corporate profits.
Some analysts have argued, however, that the
rapid rise in equity prices was simply a manifes-
tation of loose monetary policy that happened to
generate asset price inflation rather than consumer
price inflation.2 The end of the boom did coincide
with a tightening of monetary policy. This tight-
ening seems to have been in response to rising
consumer price inflation and inflation expecta-
E
xtended periods of rapidly appreciating
equity, housing, and other asset prices
in the United States and elsewhere since
the mid-1990s have brought increased
attention to the effects of monetary policy on
asset markets and the appropriate response, if
any, of monetary policy to asset price booms.
Some economists argue that financial markets
are inherently volatile and that market prices
often stray from fundamentals, suggesting that
policymakers could improve welfare by attempt-
ing to deflate asset price booms, especially if sud-
den declines in asset prices are likely to depress
economic activity. Other economists contend that
financial markets process information efficiently.
These economists tend to believe that policy-
makers usually cannot determine when assets
are mispriced and, hence, that they cannot
enhance aggregate welfare by reacting to asset
price movements.1
The U.S. stock market boom of the late 1990s
arose during a period of increased productivity
1 See Kohn (2006) for a recent comparison of alternative monetary
policy strategies in response to asset price booms. See also Bordo
and Wheelock (2004).
2 Rapid growth of asset prices amid low consumer price inflation
renewed interest in the question of whether monetary policy should
target measures of inflation that include asset prices as well as
consumer prices. Proponents of broader inflation measures include
Goodhart and Hofmann (2000) and Bryan, Cecchetti, and O’Sullivan
(2002).
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also sought to contain the booming stock market.3
The purpose of this article is to discern
whether the patterns of output and productivity
growth, inflation, and monetary policy observed
during the U.S. boom of the 1990s were similar
to those of other stock market booms in the United
States and elsewhere during the 20th century.
We are especially interested in whether these
patterns differed across monetary policy regimes.
Monetary neutrality implies that monetary policy
should not affect the price of stocks, which are
claims on real assets, in the long run. Empirical
studies conclude, however, that policy actions
affect stock prices in the short run, and many
researchers contend that the form of policy rule
used by monetary authorities can also affect asset
markets over longer horizons. In particular, some
argue that use of a monetary rule involving a
clearly specified, credible inflation objective
could lessen instability in financial markets,
though others contend that such rules can pro-
mote “imbalances” that may lead to financial
instability. This article seeks to identify similari-
ties or differences in the association of monetary
policy and stock market booms across different
monetary policy environments. In so doing, we
hope to gain insight into the role of monetary
policy in supporting or ending asset booms.4
We construct monthly, real (i.e., inflation-
adjusted) stock price indices for the United States
and nine other countries for which the necessary
data are available over most of the 20th century.
We then identify extended periods of unusually
rapid appreciation in the indices for each country,
which we define as booms. Finally, we use a sim-
ple event methodology to examine the behavior
of important macroeconomic and monetary policy
variables during stock market booms, and we
compare U.S. experiences with those of the other
countries in our sample. We find that 20th century
stock market booms typically were associated
with the business cycle, arising when output (real
gross domestic product [GDP]) growth was above
average and ending as output growth slowed.
We also find that booms tended to arise when
consumer price inflation was low and end after a
period of monetary policy tightening associated
with an actual or threatened rise in inflation. These
patterns differ little across time and, therefore,
across the different policy regimes in place over
the 20th century. Finally, the patterns we observe
for U.S. stock market booms also appear broadly
similar to those of other countries in our data.
The next section of this article briefly dis-
cusses how monetary policy might affect stock
prices. We then present information about the
stock market booms in our data. Subsequent sec-
tions examine the macroeconomic conditions
under which 20th century stock market booms
occurred in the United States and other countries.
The final section summarizes our observations
and conclusions.
MONETARY POLICY AND STOCK
PRICES
The basic efficient-markets present-value
model posits that stock prices reflect discounted
expected future dividends and, hence, that price
changes reflect changes in expected dividends
and/or the discount rate (proxied by the real
interest rate). Because stocks are claims on real
assets, monetary neutrality implies that policy
should not affect real stock prices in the long run.
Monetary policy actions might affect stock prices
over shorter horizons, however, by altering the
path of expected dividends, the discount rate, or
the equity premium.5 Early models of the effects
of monetary policy on asset prices focused on
the impact of changes in liquidity on the demand
Bordo and Wheelock
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3 For contrasting views on whether the Fed adjusted policy in
response to the stock market during this period, see Cecchetti (2003),
Rigobon and Sack (2003), Hayford and Malliaris (2004), and Meyer
(2004).
4 Bordo and Wheelock (2004) investigate the association of nominal
U.S. stock prices with output, inflation, and money stock growth
over the 19th and 20th centuries. The present article, by contrast,
focuses on periods of rapid appreciation of real stock prices and
compares the U.S. experience with the experiences of other
countries.
5 The equity premium is the excess return for holding equities over
short-term debt securities, which in the United States averaged
about 3 percent over the 19th and 20th centuries. The premium
provides compensation for uncertainty about the timing and mag-
nitude of future cash flows associated with ownership of equities
rather than fixed-income securities.for various assets that comprise the portfolio of
the private sector. Policy actions that increase
liquidity cause asset prices to rise and returns
to fall as households adjust their portfolios in
response to an increase in central bank liabilities.
Other models focused on the impact of policy on
the cost of capital and, hence, the expected growth
rates of corporate dividends or earnings.6
Several studies have found evidence that
monetary policy actions affect stock prices in
the short run. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), for
example, estimate that during 1989-2002 an unan-
ticipated 25-basis-point increase in the Federal
Reserve’s target for the federal funds rate produced
a 1 percent decline in equity prices. Further, they
find that the impact of unanticipated monetary
policy actions on stock prices occurred mainly
through their impact on expected future dividends
and excess returns (i.e., the equity premium)
rather than the real interest rate.
Although monetary policy actions appear to
affect stock prices in the short run, many econo-
mists contend that the form of policy rule used by
monetary authorities can affect the performance
of asset markets over longer horizons. Some econ-
omists argue that monetary policies that result in
persistent or highly variable inflation destabilize
financial markets (e.g., Schwartz, 1995). Rules that
stabilize the price level, however, are commonly
thought to lessen the chance of asset price bubbles
(e.g., Woodford, 2003). Some economists argue,
however, that a commitment to low inflation can
foster imbalances that lead to asset price bubbles
by generating overly optimistic expectations of
future economic growth (e.g., Borio and Lowe,
2002). Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan
made this claim at a Federal Open Market Com-
mittee (FOMC) meeting in 1996:
We have very great difficulty in monetary
policy when we confront stock market bubbles.
That is because, to the extent that we are
successful in keeping product price inflation
down, history tells us that price-earnings ratios
under those conditions go through the roof.
What is really needed to keep stock market
bubbles from occurring is a lot of product price
inflation, which historically has tended to
undercut stock markets almost everywhere.
There is a clear tradeoff. If monetary policy
succeeds in one, it fails in the other. (FOMC,
September 24, 1996, pp. 30-31)
Historically, U.S. stock market returns have
been negatively correlated with inflation (Fama
and Schwert, 1977). Goodfriend (2003) argues
that prior to the 1980s, monetary policy was an
important source of both macroeconomic and
financial market instability, which could explain
the negative relationship between stock returns
and inflation. An increase in inflation would tend
to depress stock returns because long-term interest
rates would rise in response to higher expected
inflation and tighter monetary policy and because
tighter policy would also slow economic activity
and thereby reduce current and future corporate
earnings. A reversal of policy in response to a
weak economy and lower inflation would tend
to reduce interest rates and boost stock returns.
Goodfriend (2003) contends that asset price
movements are less likely to be correlated with
policy actions if monetary policymakers are firmly
committed to maintaining price stability. Under
such a regime, he argues, long-term interest rates
will be more firmly anchored and real activity,
corporate profits, and real interest rates will
exhibit less cyclical variability. Hence, under a
policy rule that maintains a stable price level,
movements in asset prices are likely to be less
correlated with specific monetary policy actions.
One objective of this article is to determine
whether stock market booms in the United States
and other countries typically have been associ-
ated with low inflation, especially with changes
in monetary policy that foster price stability, and
whether we can observe differences in the rela-
tionships over time that might be associated with
differences in policy regimes.
STOCK MARKET BOOMS
There is, of course, no precise definition of
an asset boom, and researchers have imposed a
number of filters to identify specific episodes that
Bordo and Wheelock
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6 See Bordo and Wheelock (2004) for additional discussion and
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% change from When prior
Boom start: Boom end: month after trough 25-month peak
Country local market minimum local market peak to peak surpassed
Australia Dec. 1920 Feb. 1929 10.7 July 1921
Sept. 1930 Mar. 1937 17.8 Oct. 1934
July 1956 July 1960 15.8 Aug. 1957
Oct. 1966 Dec. 1969 21.8 Oct. 1967
Aug. 1977 Nov. 1980 21.9 Sept. 1979
July 1982 Sept. 1987 25.2 Mar. 1986
Dec. 1990 Jan. 1994 18.9 Oct. 1993
Aug. 1998 June 2000 13.4 Jan. 1999
Canada Dec. 1920 Sept. 1929 17.4 n/a
June 1932 Mar. 1937 28.0 n/a
Oct. 1953 July 1956 24.6 July 1954
Oct. 1977 Nov. 1980 22.1 n/a
July 1984 July 1987 17.9 July 1985
Jan. 1995 Apr. 1998 19.2 Nov. 1995
Aug. 1998 Aug. 2000 34.7 Dec. 1999
France Nov. 1920 July 1924 20.9 n/a
Nov. 1926 Feb. 1929 40.4 Dec. 1927
Dec. 1950 Apr. 1955 28.4 n/a
Aug. 1958 Apr. 1962 20 July 1960
June 1981 Apr. 1987 24.4 Jan. 1985
Feb. 1995 Aug. 2000 23.6 Jan. 1997
Germany June 1957 Sept. 1960 43.6 Aug. 1958
Aug. 1982 Apr. 1986 31.8 July 1983
Mar. 1995 Feb. 2000 23.9 Sept. 1996
Italy May 1932 July 1935 27.5 n/a
July 1950 Sept. 1955 18.5 Aug. 1952
June 1958 Aug. 1960 56.4 Oct. 1958
Dec. 1977 May 1981 35.0 n/a
Dec. 1982 Aug. 1986 38.2 Mar. 1986
Nov. 1995 Feb. 2000 33.6 July 1997
NOTE: *Market decline ended less than 12 months after boom peak; acomparison Jan. 1915–Dec. 1940; bcomparison Jan. 1947–Dec. 2004;
ccomparison Feb. 1920–Dec. 1940; dcomparison Jan. 1920–Dec. 1939; ecomparison Jan. 1950–Dec. 2004; fcomparison Feb. 1921–Dec. 1938;
gcomparison Feb. 1923–Dec. 1940; hcomparison March 1920–Dec. 1939; icomparison Feb. 1917–Dec. 1940; jcomparison Feb. 1916–
Dec. 1939; kcomparison Jan. 1947–Sep. 2004.Bordo and Wheelock
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Average annual Comparison
Months duration % change from average annual Percent decline
after prior peak month after % change 12 months Percent decline
surpassed prior peak during period after peak to next minimum
91 9.1 3.6a –20.1 –41.0
30 13.7 3.6 –12.2 –31.6
35 15.9 2.4b –11.6 –20.2*
26 17.5 2.4 –24.8 –42.2
14 32.1 2.4 –27.2 –47.2
18 39.3 2.4 –35.8 –46.3*
3 36.9 2.4 –23.8 –23.8
18 6.5 2.4 –0.8 –23.8
n/a n/a 3.7c –37.5 –75.1
n/a n/a 3.7 –35.6 –35.6
25 23.5 3.4b –9.2 –32.4
n/a n/a 3.4 –25.2 –52.5
24 15.3 3.4 –18.5 –26.7*
29 20.1 3.4 –10.0 –28.2*
8 42.0 3.4 –36.0 –43.6
n/a n/a 2.5d –16.1 –34.7
14 37.9 2.5 –12.0 –57.0
n/a n/a 2.8b –17.4 –11.1*
21 14.3 2.8 –18.7 –54.1
25 36.2 2.8 –32.8 –45.0
43 26.8 2.8 –29.5 –60.1
25 54.1 6.0e –24.0 –49.3
33 28.8 6.0 –18.4 –44.7
41 27.8 6.0 –25.4 –69.9
n/a n/a 0.4f –13.4 –20.0*
37 22.7 3.1e –16.6 –22.2*
23 58.7 3.1 –17.6 –17.6
n/a n/a 3.1 –46.8 –54.1
5 34.3 3.1 –26.7 –47.9
31 34.9 3.1 –18.8 –56.5Bordo and Wheelock
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Table 1, cont’d
Average annual
% change from When prior
Boom start: Boom end: month after trough 25-month peak
Country local market minimum local market peak to peak surpassed
Japan Oct. 1930 Feb. 1934 28.6 Feb. 1932
Jan. 1950 Jan. 1953 54.3 Jan. 1952
Dec. 1957 June 1961 36.3 Oct. 1958
Sept. 1982 Dec. 1989 23.9 Mar. 1983
Netherlands July 1924 Feb. 1929 10.9 Jan. 1926
June 1932 Mar. 1937 26.6 n/a
Apr. 1952 June 1957 20.3 Nov. 1954
Dec. 1957 Mar. 1961 22.2 May 1959
Sep. 1981 July 1987 22.0 Mar. 1983
Jan. 1991 Aug. 2000 17.4 June 1993
Sweden Mar. 1922 July 1929 16.9 n/a
May 1932 Mar. 1937 23.2 n/a
Mar. 1958 Aug. 1961 15.1 Aug. 1958
Sept. 1980 Mar. 1984 36.8 May 1981
Sept. 1992 Feb. 2000 31.4 Sept. 1995
United Kingdom June 1932 Dec. 1936 15.4 Feb. 1936
June 1952 July 1955 20.0 July 1954
Feb. 1958 Apr. 1961 25.4 Dec. 1958
Sept. 1981 July 1987 21.3 Oct. 1982
June 1994 Dec. 1999 12.6 Apr. 1996
United States Oct. 1923 Sept. 1929 23.7 Dec. 1924
Mar. 1935 Feb. 1937 39.7 Oct. 1935
Sept. 1953 Apr. 1956 28.8 Mar. 1954
June 1962 Jan. 1966 13.3 Dec. 1963
July 1984 Aug. 1987 22.9 Feb. 1985
Apr. 1994 Aug. 2000 17.1 Mar. 1995Bordo and Wheelock
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Average annual Comparison
Months duration % change from average annual Percent decline
after prior peak month after % change 12 months Percent decline
surpassed prior peak during period after peak to next minimum
24 26.1 1.8g –12.0 –16.6
12 93.1 6.9e –30.0 –36.4
32 38.7 6.9 –23.0 –52.7
81 22.5 6.9 –41.0 –47.6*
36 6.1 –1.8h –15.7 –71.8
n/a n/a –1.8 –18.2 –31.5
31 15.4 4.1b –19.8 –32.1*
22 15.0 4.1 –10.5 –31.2
52 20.1 4.1 –17.2 –36.7*
74 19.6 4.1 –26.8 –65.4
n/a n/a –1.8i –13.1 –73.3
n/a n/a –1.8 –12.2 –12.2
36 13 5.7b –15.3 –20.2
34 34.7 5.7 –24.6 –29.3
53 30.6 5.7 –31.2 –67.2
10 5.4 –0.4j –23.6 –44.2
12 16.4 2.8b –17.3 –31.4
28 19.6 2.8 –17.8 –31.0
57 21.5 2.8 –23.4 –34.8*
44 12.7 2.8 –10.6 –50.2
57 24.4 2.4a –30.1 –80.6
16 30.2 2.4 –39.0 –45.8
25 29.3 4.4k –9.6 –20.1
25 10.3 4.4 –12.5 –20.1*
30 21.6 4.4 –22.3 –27.5*
64 18.7 4.4 –22.8 –46.8they then define as booms. We adapt the method-
ology of Pagan and Sossounov (2003) to identify
sustained periods of rising real stock prices in the
United States and nine other developed coun-
tries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom).7 First, we calculate a monthly index
of real stock prices for each country by deflating
a nominal stock price index by a consumer price
index. We list our data and sources in the appen-
dix. Next, we identify real stock price index peaks
and troughs within rolling, 25-month windows.
We require that peaks and troughs alternate, and
so eliminate all but the highest maximum that
occurred before a subsequent trough and all but
the lowest minimum that occurred before a sub-
sequent peak. We classify as booms all periods
of at least three years from trough to peak with
an average annual rate of increase in the real stock
price index of at least 10 percent. We also classify
as booms a few episodes of exceptional real stock
price appreciation that were shorter than three
years.8
Table 1 lists the episodes we define as booms
for each country in our sample. For each boom,
we include information about the average annual
percentage increase in the market index from the
market trough to its peak. Because several booms
began as recoveries from market declines, we also
note when the real stock price index surpassed its
prior 25-month peak and report the average annual
percentage increase in the index after that date.
For comparison, Table 1 also reports informa-
tion about long-run average annual rates of change
in the real stock price index for each country. For
example, the U.S. real stock price index increased
at an average annual rate of 2.4 percent during
1915-40 and 4.4 percent during 1947-2004. Thus,
the periods we define as booms were characterized
by rates of appreciation that were substantially
higher than long-run averages. Finally, Table 1 also
includes information about the extent to which
the real stock price index declined during the 12
months following a market peak and from the
market peak to the next market trough. Almost all
booms were followed by real declines of at least
10 percent within 12 months. Not all booms ended
with a spectacular crash, however, and the lengths
and sizes of market declines after booms varied
widely.
Cross-country comparisons of real stock price
index growth rates are problematic because of
differences in the composition of the stock market
indices of individual countries. For the interwar
period, cross-country comparisons are further
complicated by differences across countries in
(i) the dates when monthly data on a nominal
stock price index and inflation are first available
and (ii) the nature and the availability of stock
price data for the late 1930s associated with when
countries became involved in World War II.
For the post-World War II period, we report
average growth rates for 1947-2004 for all coun-
tries in the sample except Germany, Italy, and
Japan, for which we report growth rates over
1950-2004. The real stock price indices for these
three countries exhibit rapid growth during the
1950s compared with average growth rates for sub-
sequent decades. Among the other sample coun-
tries, we note considerable variation in average
real stock price growth rates, ranging from 2.4
percent for Australia to 5.7 percent for Sweden.
Again, however, such long-run cross-country
comparisons are problematic because the perform-
ance of stock markets varied considerably over
time within countries, as well as because of differ-
ences in the coverage of industries and firms in
the stock market indices of individual countries.
Not surprisingly, we find considerable coin-
cidence in the occurrence of stock market booms
across sample countries. For example, most coun-
tries experienced a substantial increase in real
stock prices during the 1920s and a market peak
in 1929. Several countries also had booms in the
mid-1930s as their economies climbed out of the
Great Depression. More recently, most countries
Bordo and Wheelock
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7 We selected our sample countries based on the availability of his-
torical data on a stock market index and key macroeconomic series,
which obviously gives rise to possible sample selection bias. We
are unsure of the extent to which our findings would differ if our
sample included recently developed or emerging market economies.
8 Helbling and Terrones (2004) use a similar procedure to identify
booms and busts. Specifically, they identify turning points in the
log-level of real equity prices over five-quarter windows and define
booms (busts) as the largest one-fourth of all price increases
(declines).in our sample had booms in the 1980s and again
in the 1990s. Several countries experienced a
market peak within a few months of the U.S. peak
in August 1987; and, among our sample, only
Japan failed to experience a stock market boom
in the 1990s, leading to a peak in 1999 or 2000.9
THE U.S. STOCK MARKET BOOM
OF 1994-2000
This article seeks to discern whether patterns
observed during the U.S. stock market boom of
the 1990s were similar to those observed during
prior booms in the United States and other coun-
tries. U.S. stock prices rose rapidly during the
second half of the 1990s, which many analysts
attributed to advances in information-processing
technology and increased productivity growth.
Both current U.S. output (GDP) and productivity
growth were high during these years, whereas
inflation was low.
Figure 1 plots data on U.S. real GDP growth
relative to its long-run average during the 20 quar-
ters before and after the peak in real stock prices
inthethirdquarterof2000(quarter“0”).RealGDP
growth exceeded its long-run average by approxi-
mately 1 percentage point during the 17 quarters
preceding 2000:Q3, then declined sharply as the
U.S. economy entered a recession in 2000:Q4.
Figure 1 also plots the median growth rates of real
GDP (relative to its long-run average) during mar-
ket peak quarters and in the 20 quarters before and
after market peaks across all post-1970 stock mar-
ket booms among our sample countries, including
the U.S. boom of 1994-2000.10 Across all booms,
median output growth was much closer to its long-
run average than U.S. output growth was during
the 1994-2000 boom. The decline in output after
the “typical” market peak also began later and
was much less steep than was experienced after
Bordo and Wheelock
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9 See Bordo and Wheelock (2006) for further evidence on the coin-
cidence of stock market booms and correlation of market returns
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Figure 1
Real GDP Growth Relative to Its Long-Run Average: Post-1970 Booms
NOTE: The shaded area comprises the median ￿ the mean absolute deviation.
10 We define long-run average GDP growth as the average annual rate
during 1960-2001.Bordo and Wheelock
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Figure 2
Labor Productivity Growth Relative to Its Long-Run Average: Post-1970 Booms
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Figure 3
Inflation Relative to Its Long-Run Average: Post-1970 Booms
NOTE: The shaded area comprises the median ￿ the mean absolute deviation.the U.S. stock market peak in 2000:Q3. Figure 1
also displays the mean absolute deviation of real
GDP growth (relative to its long-run average) in
each quarter across all post-1970 booms. Real GDP
growth varied widely during post-1970 booms,
and even more so in the quarters after market
peaks.11
Market analysts frequently attributed the
stock market boom of the late 1990s to advances
in information technology and an increase in
productivity growth that seemed to justify expec-
tations of elevated corporate profits and dividends.
Figure 2 plots data on labor productivity growth
during the U.S. boom of 1994-2000 and the median
across all post-1970 stock market booms.12
Whereas U.S. labor productivity growth exceeded
its long-run average during four of five years
between 1996 and 2000, across all booms, median
productivity growth hovered near its long-run
average.13 Hence, in occurring during a period
of above-average productivity growth, the U.S.
boom of 1994-2000 was somewhat unusual among
recent stock market booms.
While output and productivity growth were
both unusually rapid during the U.S. stock market
boom of the late 1990s, inflation was unusually
low. Consumer price inflation (CPI) hovered
between 2.5 and 3 percent from 1992 to 1996, then
held below 2 percent from late 1997 to early 1999.
Figure 3 plots monthly data on CPI inflation
(relative to its long-run average) during the U.S.
boom of 1994-2000, as well as the median across
all post-1970 booms.14 The figure shows that infla-
tion was below its long-run average throughout
the 60 months preceding the August 2000 peak
in U.S. real stock prices. Further, the figure shows
a decline in the inflation rate that occurred in 1997
and early 1998 (months “44” to “29”) and an
increase during 1999 and the first half of 2000
(approximately the last 20 months of the boom
period). Across all post-1970 booms, median infla-
tion was below average and declining until some
12 months before a stock market peak month,
when inflation began to rise. Thus, both the U.S.
stock market boom of 1994-2000 and the “typical”
post-1970 boom arose when inflation was below
average and ended after several months of rising
inflation.
The U.S. stock market boom of 1994-2000
attracted considerable attention from Federal
Reserve officials and other policymakers. Fed
officials feared that rapid gains in stock market
wealth would cause rapid growth in spending
and inflation, but officials were perhaps even
more concerned that a sudden decline in the
market could lead to a recession.15 Policymakers
were uncertain about how to respond to the boom-
ing stock market, while financial markets were
acutely sensitive to any statements or actions
by the Fed that signaled possible changes in the
direction of policy. Although the Fed was becom-
ing increasingly transparent about its policies,
it neither specified an inflation objective nor
explained how it might react to the booming
stock market.
In December 1996, Federal Reserve Chairman
Greenspan made his famous “irrational exuber-
ance” speech, in which he wondered publicly how
to determine when equity prices are too high in
relation to fundamentals (Greenspan, 1996). Stock
prices fell briefly after the Chairman’s speech on
fears that the Fed would tighten monetary policy
or take other actions to slow the growth of stock
prices. Indeed, at an FOMC meeting in February
1997, Greenspan suggested that the Fed might
want to tighten policy in response to rising stock
prices. He argued that the prevailing level of equity
prices, along with unusually narrow interest rate
credit spreads, “suggest[s] that product prices
alone should not be the sole criterion [for conduct-
ing monetary policy] if we are going to maintain
Bordo and Wheelock
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW MARCH/APRIL 2007 101
15 See Meyer (2004) for an interesting account of Federal Reserve
policymaking during this period.
11 For example, several countries had stock market booms that coin-
cided with the U.S. boom of 1994-2000. Among them, Australia,
Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom experienced real GDP
growth rates that were consistently higher than their long-run aver-
ages; but France, Germany, and Italy had growth rates that were
near or below average.
12 Throughout the paper, for all figures plotting annual data, we
define the market peak year “0” as the year prior to the actual peak
if the peak occurred in the first half of a year.
13 Here we define the long-run average productivity growth rate as
the average annual growth rate for 1970-2004.
14 Here we define the long-run average inflation rate as the average
rate during 1947-2004.a stable, viable financial system whose funda-
mental goal…is the attainment of maximum sus-
tainable economic growth” (FOMC, February
4-5, 1997, p. 103).
The FOMC increased its federal funds rate
target by 25 basis points in March 1997, but then
left the target unchanged over the remainder of
the year. Inflation was falling, which puzzled Fed
officials who struggled to understand the decline
amid rapid economic growth and falling unem-
ployment.16 Chairman Greenspan was an early
proponent of the view that advances in informa-
tion processing technology had increased the
potential growth rate of output, but most Fed
officials and staff were skeptical.17 Despite their
misgivings about the stock market, however, Fed
officials chose not to raise their funds rate target
as long as inflation continued to fall. Of course,
in not cutting their target, Fed officials permitted
the (ex post) real funds rate to rise as the inflation
rate fell.
Figure 4 plots data on the federal funds rate
during the U.S. stock market boom of 1994-2000,
and the median level of short-term interest rates
across all post-1970 booms in our dataset.18 Both
the funds rate and the median are shown relative
to their levels in the months of stock market peaks
(month “0”). Figure 5 plots the level of the real
interest rate, defined as the nominal short-term
interest rate minus the trailing year-over-year
inflation rate, during the U.S. stock market boom
of 1994-2000 and the median level across all
booms. Finally, Figure 6 plots the spread between
the yield on long-term Treasury securities and
the short-term interest rate for boom periods. The
real interest rate and the term spread are two meas-
ures that economists often monitor to gauge the
stance of monetary policy.
Figures 5 and 6 show that the real funds rate
rose and the term spread fell during 1997 (months
“–43” to “–32”), and, hence, by these measures,
18 For countries for which data are available, we use an overnight
interest rate similar to the U.S. federal funds rate. Otherwise, we use
another short-term money market interest rate. See the appendix
for details.
Bordo and Wheelock
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Figure 4
Short-Term Interest Rate Relative to Its Rate in Peak Month: Post-1970 Booms
16 Meyer (2004, pp. 79-80).
17 Meyer (2004, pp. 80-84, 123-25).Bordo and Wheelock
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Interest Rate Term Spread: Post-1970 Booms
NOTE: The shaded area comprises the median ￿ the mean absolute deviation.monetary policy tightened. Concern about stock
market speculation and rapid economic growth
kept the Fed from cutting its funds rate target,
even as inflation fell, which effectively allowed
policy to tighten.
The next major move in monetary policy came
in response to a sudden demand for liquidity in
the wake of a Russian government bond default
and spreading financial crisis in Asia during the
summer and fall of 1998. The Fed cut its funds
rate target by 75 basis points between September
and November 1998 (months “–23” and “–21”),
and the real interest rate fell. The spread between
long-term Treasury security yields and short-term
interest rates also rose as the demand for liquidity
abated.
Inflation began to rise in 1999; citing “a signifi-
cant risk of rising inflation,” the FOMC began to
raise its federal funds rate target in June (Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1999,
p. 242). Over the subsequent year, the Committee
increased its target by a total of 175 basis points.19
For the most part, however, increases in the fed-
eral funds rate merely kept pace with the rising
inflation rate, which left the real interest rate
essentially unchanged. Fed officials sought to
contain inflation throughout the period, but
resisted the temptation to increase the funds rate
faster than the inflation rate because they desired
to accommodate a perceived increase in the poten-
tial growth rate of the economy associated with
higher productivity growth. Fed officials also
worried that aggressive tightening could cause a
sharp decline in the stock market and a substan-
tial slowing of economic activity.20
By mid-2000, Fed officials had decided to
act more aggressively against inflation. At their
May 2000 meeting, FOMC members concluded
that demand growth was continuing to exceed
even the increased rate of potential output growth
and that more aggressive tightening was necessary:
“A more forceful policy move...was desirable in
light of the extraordinary and persisting strength
of overall demand, exceeding even the increas-
ingly rapid growth of potential supply” (Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2000,
p. 224). Thus, rather than increasing their funds
rate target by the usual 25-basis-point increment,
Fed officials voted to raise their target by 50 basis
points to 6.5 percent, where it remained through-
out the rest of 2000. As shown in Figures 5 and 6,
the real interest rate rose and the term spread
declined sharply during the six months preceding
the August 2000 peak in real stock prices. Hence,
by conventional measures, the stock market boom
ended after several months of increasingly tighter
monetary policy.21
Figures 5 and 6 also plot the median real
interest rate and term spread levels across all post-
1970 booms in our dataset. The pattern followed
by the median real rate level is similar to that of
the real federal funds rate during the U.S. boom
of 1994-2000: After peaking near 4 percent some
24 months before a stock market peak, the median
real rate fell approximately 1 percentage point
before rising again during the year preceding the
market peak. The median term spread does not,
however, exhibit the decline observed in the U.S.
term spread during the last months of the U.S.
boom of 1994-2000. Nevertheless, it appears that,
like the U.S. stock market boom of 1994-2000, the
end of the “typical” post-1970 boom followed
some tightening of monetary policy associated
with rising inflation.
MONETARY POLICY AND STOCK
MARKET BOOMS BEFORE 1970
Next we examine the economic and monetary
policy conditions under which stock market
booms occurred earlier in the 20th century. The
historical approach enables us to examine the
association of booms with macroeconomic con-
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19 The target had been reduced from 5 percent to 4.75 percent on
November 17, 1998. The target was raised to 5 percent on June 30,
1999, and elevated in five more steps to 6.5 percent as of May 16,
2000.
20 Meyer (2004, pp. 162-63).
21 The specific ending date of the boom is ambiguous. Although we
date the end of the boom as the month that the inflation-adjusted
S&P 500 composite index reached its peak (based on monthly aver-
ages of daily closing values), the peak in the nonadjusted index
occurred on March 24. The dates on which other indices peaked
include the Dow Jones industrial average on January 14, the New
York Stock Exchange composite index on September 1, and the
NASDAQ composite index on March 10.ditions and monetary policy under different
monetary and financial regulatory regimes.
Pre-World War II Booms
The stock market booms of 1923-29 and 1994-
2000 stand out among all U.S. booms in terms of
their length and the extent to which stock prices
rose, and they have often been compared to one
another. Like the 1990s boom, the U.S. boom of
1923-29 arose during a period of above average
economic growth and low inflation. As with the
recent boom, in the 1920s, many analysts attrib-
uted the booming stock market to advances in
technology and business management techniques
that promised rapid growth of economic activity
and corporate profits.22 Technological break-
throughs of the late-19th and early-20th centuries,
especially in electric power distribution and
motors, were widely adopted by American indus-
try in the 1920s (David, 1990). Productivity growth
increased sharply, especially in the manufactur-
ing sector. For the private domestic economy as
a whole, total factor productivity and labor pro-
ductivity grew at average annual rates of 2.0 per-
cent and 2.2 percent, respectively, during 1919-29,
compared with rates of 1.1 percent and 1.5 percent
during 1909-19 and 1.6 and 1.8 percent during
1929-37 (Kendrick, 1961, p. 72).23
Figure 7 plots U.S. real GDP growth relative
to its long-run average during 1929 (year “0”) and
the 16 surrounding years.24 The figure also plots
median real GDP growth (relative to its long-run
average) across all prewar booms in our dataset,
including the U.S. boom of 1923-29. U.S. output
growth was especially rapid at the start of the
Bordo and Wheelock
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Figure 7
Real GDP Growth Relative to Its Long-Run Average: Prewar Booms
NOTE: The shaded area comprises the median ￿ the mean absolute deviation.
22 See Bordo and Wheelock (2006) and White (2006) and the refer-
ences therein.
23 Annual data suggest, however, that productivity growth was slower
toward the end of the 1920s when the stock market boom was in
full swing than it had been earlier in the decade. Total factor pro-
ductivity growth and labor productivity growth averaged 2.6 and
3.0 percent during 1920-24 and 1.3 and 1.7 percent during 1925-29
(Kendrick, 1961, Table A-XXII). Productivity change is, however,
more correctly measured between similar points in the business
cycle.
24 We define the long-run average real GDP growth rate as the average
annual rate for 1871-1939.Bordo and Wheelock
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Commercial Paper Rate: 1920s Booms
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Inflation Rate Relative to Its Long-Run Average: Prewar Booms
NOTE: The shaded area comprises the median ￿ the mean absolute deviation.boom in 1923 (year “–6”) and also in 1929 (year
“0”), when output growth exceeded its long-run
average by 2.8 percentage points. Output growth
was below its long-run average, however, in 1927
and 1928.25 By contrast, median output growth
across all booms exceeded its long-run average
during both market peak years and the three years
preceding the peak.
Figure 8 shows the behavior of inflation
during the U.S. boom of 1923-29, as well as the
median inflation rate across all prewar booms in
our dataset. U.S. inflation was below average dur-
ing 1926-28 and approximately equal to its long-
run average during 1929. The modest increase in
the inflation rate during the last year of the boom
is similar to the pattern observed during the U.S.
boom of 1994-2000 and in the median across all
post-1970 booms. Figure 8 also shows an increase
in the median rate of inflation toward the end of
prewar booms in general. Thus, like the typical
post-1970 stock market boom, the typical prewar
boom arose when inflation was below average
and ended within a year or two of higher inflation.
The Federal Reserve System was established
in 1914, and monetary policy was still in its
infancy during the 1920s. World War I disrupted
the international gold standard, but the United
States only briefly suspended gold payments
during the war. The Federal Reserve Act required
the System to maintain a gold reserve, but by the
early 1920s, the Fed’s gold reserves were sufficient
to allow policymakers to pursue discretionary
monetary policy. Fed officials successfully resisted
attempts by Congress to impose an explicit infla-
tion objective on the Fed, and Fed officials made
few public statements about their policy objectives
or tactics. The Fed pursued a strategy aimed at
manipulating bank reserves and market interest
rates to achieve an evolving set of objectives,
which by 1928 included control of the booming
stock market.26
The Federal Reserve tightened monetary
policy aggressively in 1928-29, prompted by the
rapid rise in stock prices and a perception that
Federal Reserve credit was being used to finance
speculative activity. Fed officials viewed specu-
lation in stocks, commodities, and other assets
as a manifestation of inflation that called for a
tightening of credit conditions.
Figure 9 plots the interest rate on commercial
paper of four- to six-month maturity during the
stock market boom of 1923-29, as well as the
median level of short-term interest rates across
all booms of the 1920s in our data set.27 The figure
shows a sharp increase in U.S. short-term interest
rates during the 18 months ending in September
1929, coinciding with the Fed’s tightening. The
median interest rate level across all booms rose
much less.
Figure 10 plots the real commercial paper
interest rate during the stock market boom of
1923-29 and the median level of interest rates
across all booms of the decade. The U.S. real rate
increased from an average of 4.7 percent during
1926-27 to an average of 6.0 percent between
January 1928 and September 1929. The median
across all 1920s booms followed a somewhat
different pattern, first declining some 18 months
before the stock market peak, then rising in the
six months before the market peak.28
The Fed’s monetary policy tightening of 1928-
29 is also evident in the behavior of the money
stock. Figure 11 plots the growth rate of the money
stock relative to its long-run average during the
U.S. boom of 1923-29 and the median growth
rate across all prewar booms.29 U.S. money stock
growth fell below its long-run average in 1926
and trended downward to a low point in 1932.
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25 Throughout this article we use annual real GDP data from Maddison
(2003), which are adjusted to be comparable across countries.
Quarterly estimates of U.S. real gross national product from Balke
and Gordon (1986) indicate that output growth exceeded its long-run
(i.e., 1875-1939) average by 0.9 percentage points during 1923:Q1–
1929:Q3 and by 3.5 percentage points during 1928:Q1–1929:Q3.
26 See Chandler (1958), Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Meltzer (2003),
Wheelock (1991), and Wicker (1966) for discussion and evidence
on the Fed’s policy objectives and strategy during the 1920s.
27 We lack commercial paper rate data for Australia and Canada for
the prewar period.
28 We do not include a figure with the term spread because market
yield data on both a short- and long-term government security are
not available for many countries during the 1920s. U.S. short-term
interest rates rose relative to long-term rates over the 18 months
ending in September 1929, with the commercial paper rate rising
from about 100 basis points above the long-term U.S. Treasury bond
yield to about 250 basis points above the Treasury yield. Hence,
the yield curve became increasingly inverted.
29 Here we define the long-run average money stock growth rate as
the average rate during 1881-1939.Figure 12 shows that the growth of the real money
stock also declined relative to its long-run average,
especially in 1929. By contrast, median nominal
and real money stock growth rose during the year
of market peaks, as Figures 11 and 12 also show.
Thus, the Fed’s policy tightening over the 18
months before the stock market peak in September
1929 was considerably more aggressive than the
tightening that occurred toward the end of the
typical prewar boom.
Although the Federal Reserve provided sub-
stantial liquidity following the October 1929 stock
market crash, monetary conditions tightened
again in 1930 and the U.S. economy plunged
into a depression. Real interest rates soared (see
Figure 10), and both the nominal and real money
stocks collapsed (see Figures 11 and 12). Real GDP
and the price level both fell sharply (see Figures 7
and 8). Although concerned about the economy,
the Federal Reserve failed to mount an aggressive
response to the Depression, in part because policy-
makers were fearful of reigniting stock market
speculation.30 In the event, the real value of the
Standard and Poor’s composite stock price index
fell some 80 percent from its 1929 peak to its low
in 1932.
Many countries experienced significant
declines in economic activity and stock prices
during the Great Depression. Several, including
the United States, also experienced a stock market
boom as their economies recovered. In many
countries, recovery began when their currency
was devalued or the country abandoned the gold
standard (Eichengreen, 1992). Stock markets
recovered and boom periods were characterized
by rapid output and money stock growth and
moderate inflation.
U.S. stock prices rose rapidly during the mid-
1930s: The Standard and Poor’s composite index
rose at an inflation-adjusted rate of nearly 40 per-
cent per year between March 1935 and February
1937. The boom ended abruptly in early 1937,
however, and the U.S. economy entered a reces-
sion. Once again, the end of the boom coincided
with a tightening of monetary conditions.
Bordo and Wheelock
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Figure 10
Real Commercial Paper Rate: 1920s Booms
NOTE: The shaded area comprises the median ￿ the mean absolute deviation.
30 See Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Meltzer (2003), and Wheelock
(1991 and 1992) and the references therein for explanations of the
Fed’s behavior during the Great Depression.Bordo and Wheelock
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Figure 11
Money Stock Growth Relative to Its Long-Run Average: Prewar Booms
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Real Money Stock Growth Relative to Its Long-Run Average: Prewar Booms
NOTE: The shaded area comprises the median ￿ the mean absolute deviation.The Federal Reserve had largely stayed on
the sidelines as the U.S. economy pulled out of
the Depression and the pace of economic activity
accelerated. As the recovery continued, however,
Fed officials became increasingly concerned about
the potential for inflation. Beginning in 1933, gold
inflows caused bank reserves and the money
stock to grow rapidly, and banks built up huge
stocks of reserves in excess of legal requirements.
Fed officials feared that the accumulation of
excess reserves posed an inflationary threat and
took a series of steps to reduce them: The Federal
Reserve Board increased reserve requirements
by 50 percent in August 1936; the Treasury
Department began to neutralize gold inflows in
December 1936; and the Fed hiked reserve require-
ments again on January 30, 1937. Following these
actions, money stock growth slowed (from 13
percent in 1936 to 4 percent in 1937), interest
rates rose, and the stock market peaked and began
to fall as the boom ended.
Early Postwar Booms
We examine stock market booms of the 1950s
and 1960s separately from those of the 1970s to
1990s because of sharp differences in the regula-
tory and monetary regimes that prevailed in the
two periods. In addition, for some countries, high-
frequency economic and financial data are not
available for the 1950s and 1960s.
Many countries adopted new regulations on
financial markets and international capital flows
in response to the financial disruptions of the
Great Depression. The Great Depression also effec-
tively ended the international gold standard, as
countries either abandoned the standard altogether
or imposed exchange controls that limited its func-
tioning (Eichengreen, 1992). World War II brought
even tighter controls, especially in Europe, that
included restrictions on the issuance of private
securities and the movement of capital across
international borders. The postwar international
monetary system was defined by the Bretton
Woods system of fixed exchange rates and capital
controls. Wartime controls were gradually relaxed
over time, but deregulation was protracted. The
pace of deregulation quickened in the 1970s and
1980s as countries sought to keep their financial
markets competitive in the face of advances in
information-processing technology that encour-
aged financial innovation and globalization. At
the same time, the international monetary regime
changed dramatically with the collapse of the
Bretton Woods system in 1971.31
The United States experienced two stock mar-
ket booms during the 1950s and 1960s, one ending
in April 1956 and another ending in January 1966.
Figure 13 plots data on U.S. real GDP growth rel-
ative to its long-run average during these two
episodes. The figure also plots the median growth
rates across all booms of the 1950s and 1960s in
our data set, as well as the mean absolute devia-
tion of observations around the median.
U.S. output growth was highly variable dur-
ing the boom of 1953-56. As shown in Figure 13,
real GDP contracted by almost 1 percent in 1954
(year “–1”), but expanded by nearly 7 percent in
1955 (year “0”).32 Output growth was less variable
during the stock market boom of 1962-66 and
exceeded its long-run average throughout the
period. Output growth exceeded its long-run
average by nearly 3 percentage points in 1965
(year “0”) and continued to grow rapidly after the
peak in the real stock price index in January 1966.
Median real GDP growth exceeded its long-run
average across all booms of the 1950s and 1960s,
and rose during the final two years of booms. Out-
put growth was unusually rapid during the 1950s
and 1960s, especially among European countries
and Japan. Whereas U.S. output growth fell below
its long-run average within a year of the U.S. stock
market peaks in April 1956 and January 1966,
median output growth remained above its long-
run average after the “typical” stock market boom
of the 1950s and 1960s had ended.33
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31 See Bordo and Wheelock (2006) for additional discussion and
evidence on changes over time in the coincidence of stock market
booms and correlation of stock returns across our sample countries.
See also Goetzmann, Li, and Rouwenhorst (2001) and Obstfeld
and Taylor (1998) for evidence on the international integration of
financial markets throughout the 20th century.
32 As noted previously, in figures that present annual data, we define
year “0” as the year prior to the actual market peak if the peak
occurred during the first half of a calendar year.
33 On the “Golden Age” of European economic growth before 1973,
see Crafts and Toniolo (1996).Bordo and Wheelock
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Figure 13
Real GDP Growth Relative to Its Long-Run Average: 1950s-60s Booms
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Inflation Rate Relative to Its Long-Run Average: 1950s-60s Booms
NOTE: The shaded area comprises the median ￿ the mean absolute deviation.Figure 14 plots inflation rates (relative to their
long-run averages) during the two U.S. stock
market booms of the 1950s and 1960s, alongside
median inflation across all booms of the period
and the mean absolute deviation of observations
around the median. As during both the prewar
and post-1970 periods, during the 1950s and
1960s stock market booms typically arose when
inflation was below its long-run average and ended
after inflation had risen. The U.S. booms of the
1950s and 1960s were no exception. After a burst
of inflation during the Korean War, the U.S. infla-
tion rate stayed below 1 percent per year through-
out 1952-55, before rising to 3 percent in 1956-57.
Inflation then fell back and remained below 2
percent in each year from 1958 to 1965. Inflation
rose again in 1965, however, and reached 3.4
percent in 1966.
Resembling the patterns of both prewar and
post-1970 booms, the increases in inflation before
the U.S. stock market peaks in 1956 and 1966
were accompanied by higher interest rates and
other evidence of monetary tightening. Figure 15
plots data on short-term interest rates during the
two U.S. booms and the median across all booms
of the 1950s and 1960s.34 The figures show the
level of the interest rate in each month relative
to its level in the month when the real stock price
index reached its peak (month “0”).
Short-term interest rates rose some 2 percent-
age points over the 24 months ending in April
1956, reflecting actions by the Federal Reserve to
ward off inflation and curb the flow of credit to
the stock market. The Fed began a series of tight-
ening steps in 1954 that included open-market
operations and hikes in the discount rate and
margin requirements.35 Fed officials continued
to focus on inflation during 1955 and 1956 and
frequently discussed the importance of preventing
inflation from rising. For example, at an FOMC
Bordo and Wheelock
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Figure 15
Short-Term Interest Rate Relative to Its Rate in Peak Month: 1950s-60s Booms
34 When available, we use an overnight interest rate, such as the U.S.
federal funds rate, in constructing the interest rate series for this
period. Otherwise, we use a short-term Treasury security yield.
Monthly data on the federal funds rate are not available until July
1954, for example, and so we use the yield on 3-month Treasury
bills for earlier months.
35 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 empowered the Federal
Reserve Board to regulate margin requirements on loans granted
by banks and securities firms for the purpose of purchasing or
owning stocks. The margin requirement establishes the minimum
percentage of a stock purchase that must be self-financed rather
than financed by borrowing.meeting in January 1955, Chairman William
McChesney Martin Jr. stated that “[w]hat we are
wrestling with at the moment is the possibility
that inflationary seeds may be germinating, and
that when they come to full bloom it will be dif-
ficult to restrain them...We want to nip inflation
in the bud” (Federal Open Market Committee,
January 11, 1955, pp. 7-8). Martin also expressed
concern about the booming stock market, arguing
that “we ought to be considering the possibility
of another signal to the stock market either through
a further increase in the margin or, preferably
through the discount rate” (p. 9).
Fed officials expressed concern about the
booming stock market throughout 1955, occa-
sionally associating movements in stock prices
with general price inflation. For example, at an
FOMC meeting in August, Chairman Martin com-
mented that “all danger signals are now flashing
red. Inflation is a thief in the night and if we don’t
act promptly and decisively we will always be
behind...A move such as we had in General
Motors (stock) of fifteen points in one day would
be disastrous if it developed over the whole price
level” (Federal Open Market Committee, August 2,
1955, p. 13).
In the event, inflation remained low through-
out 1954 and 1955 and, consequently, the increase
in short-term interest rates during these years
resulted in a similar-sized increase in the real
interest rate, as shown in Figure 16. Money stock
growth also slowed, as shown in Figure 17, though
real money stock growth remained slightly above
its long-run average, as shown in Figure 18.36
Monetary conditions did not tighten as
sharply before the U.S. stock market peak in
January 1966 as they had before the April 1956
peak. As shown in Figure 15, the federal funds
rate rose by approximately 0.5 percentage points
Bordo and Wheelock
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Figure 16
Real Short-Term Interest Rate: 1950s-60s Booms
NOTE: The shaded area comprises the median ￿ the mean absolute deviation.
36 Calomiris and Wheelock (1998) note a close, negative correlation
between the level of free reserves and inflation during the 1950s.
Further, they note that growth of the money stock (M1) was posi-
tively correlated with the level of free reserves during the 1950s,
but not during the 1960s, which could explain the Fed’s apparent
success in maintaining low inflation during the 1950s, but not dur-
ing the 1960s. Romer and Romer (2002) find that Fed policy was
consistent with the “Taylor principle” during the 1950s, but not
during the 1960s, in that movements in the real interest rate were
sufficient to stabilize inflation during the 1950s, but not during
the 1960s.Bordo and Wheelock
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Figure 18
Real Money Stock Growth Relative to Its Long-Run Average: 1950s-60s Booms
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Figure 17
Money Stock Growth Relative to Its Long-Run Average: 1950s-60s Booms
NOTE: The shaded area comprises the median ￿ the mean absolute deviation.in late 1964 (months “–15” to “–13”), but changed
little during 1965. The real funds rate, shown in
Figure 16, peaked in early 1965 (month “–11”),
then declined in the second quarter when inflation
began to rise. The real funds rate then changed
little over the remainder of the year. Further, both
nominal and real money stock growth remained
above their long-run average rates during 1965
(year “0” in Figures 17 and 18).
The January 1966 stock market peak did,
however, occur shortly after a highly publicized
monetary policy action. The increase in inflation
in the second quarter of 1965 persisted through
the remainder of the year, and by the fourth quar-
ter Fed officials were convinced that monetary
policy had to tighten. Memoranda from the FOMC
meeting in November state that Chairman Martin
argued that “the country was in a period of creep-
ing inflation...In short, he thought the economy
was growing too fast at the moment” (FOMC,
November 23, 1965, p. 85). Fed officials then took
steps to tighten, including a highly publicized
discount rate increase in early December that
sparked a sharp rebuke from President Johnson.37
The stock market peak occurred shortly thereafter,
and the boom of 1962-66 was over.
Other countries that had booms during the
1950s and 1960s experienced interest rate and
money stock growth patterns that were similar to
those of the two U.S. booms. The median level of
short-term interest rates across all booms rose by
1 percentage point during the 8 to 15 months
before stock market peaks. The median real inter-
est rate level fluctuated widely, with little trend
during the 24 months before market peaks; but
both nominal and real money stock growth
declined during the last two years of booms,
indicating that some monetary policy tightening
preceded the end of the typical boom.
OBSERVATIONS AND
CONCLUSIONS
The U.S. stock market boom of 1994-2000
arose during a period of unusually rapid growth
of output and productivity and low inflation.
Technological advances and higher productivity
growth convinced many observers that corporate
profits would continue to grow rapidly and justify
soaring equity prices. Further, shrinking govern-
ment budget deficits and low inflation suggested
that interest rates would remain low. Eventually,
however, inflation began to rise, monetary policy
tightened, and the boom ended.
Our review of earlier stock market booms in
the United States and nine other developed
countries during the 20th century indicates that
the patterns observed during the U.S. boom of
1994-2000 were similar to those of earlier booms.
Stock market booms typically arose when output
growth exceeded its long-run average and when
inflation was below its long-run average. There
were, however, exceptions. Notably, we find that
across all post-1970 booms the median growth
rates of real GDP and productivity did not sub-
stantially exceed their long-run averages.38 We
find less variation in the association of booms with
low inflation than we do in the association of
booms with rapid output or productivity growth.
Further, we find that both nominal and real money
stock growth were typically below average dur-
ing booms, suggesting that booms did not result
from excessive liquidity.39
We find that 20th century stock market booms
often ended following an increase in inflation
and a tightening of monetary conditions. All U.S.
booms ended after explicit tightening by the
Federal Reserve in response to actual or threat-
ened inflation. The Fed tightened policy in 1928-
29 because policymakers believed that asset price
appreciation was a form of inflation that required
an aggressive response. During subsequent booms,
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38 Bordo and Wheelock (2006) speculate that increased financial
globalization since the 1970s may have weakened the connection
between stock market performance and domestic output growth in
some countries. Further, among European countries, stock market
performance in the 1990s may have been heavily influenced by
steps taken to integrate national economies, especially monetary
union.
39 Some analysts have argued that asset booms reflect excessive
growth of credit. We have been unable to locate data on credit that
are comparable across all of the countries in our sample, especially
for earlier periods. A cursory review of what data we have obtained,
however, shows no consistent association of booms with credit
growth.
37 See Maisel (1973, pp. 69-77).the Fed’s principal goal was to halt an incipient
rise in consumer price inflation, though concern
about stock market speculation appears to have
been a secondary reason for tightening in some
cases.
Although the U.S. monetary policy regime
changed substantially over time, we find little
variation in the association of stock market booms
with inflation or in the end of booms with mone-
tary policy actions to control inflation. Even under
the gold standard of the 1920s, however, the Fed
had considerable latitude in pursuing discretion-
ary monetary policy and conceivably the absence
of a clear statement of objectives contributed to
instability in asset markets. Recent research sug-
gests that the form of rule used by monetary
authorities, including its communication strate-
gies, can influence how policy actions affect eco-
nomic activity.40 Additional research is needed,
however, to determine whether a clear statement
of objectives and strategy to achieve those objec-
tives would alter the association of asset booms
with low inflation or the effect that policy actions
to control inflation have on asset markets.
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This appendix provides information about the data and sources used in this article. It describes the
stock price index data that are used and then provides information about the data used in each figure
in the article.
STOCK PRICE INDEX (nominal, monthly data)
For all countries except the United States, the stock price data are from Global Financial Data
(www.globalfinancialdata.com). The following lists the Global Financial Data series identifier and
description for each country:
Australia: AORDM, Australia ASX All-Ordinaries
Canada: GSPTSEM, Canada S&P/TSX 300 Composite
France: SBF250M, France SBF-250 Index
Germany: FWBXXM, Germany CDAX Composite Index
Italy: BCIIM, Banca Commerciale Italiana Index
Japan: N225M, Japan Nikkei 225 Stock Average
Netherlands: AAXM, Netherlands All-Share Price Index
Sweden: SWAVM, Sweden Affarsvarlden General Index
United Kingdom: FTASM, UK FT-Actuaries All-Share Index
United States: NBER Macro History Database, series m11025a (1871:01–1920:12);
Standard & Poor’s 500 Composite Index (1941-43 = 10), monthly average of
daily data obtained from Haver Analytics (1921:01–2004:12)
REAL STOCK PRICE (monthly)
We use consumer price index data to deflate nominal stock prices to obtain a real stock price. For
all countries except the United States, our consumer price index data are from Global Financial Data.
The following lists the Global Financial Data consumer price index series identifier for each country.









United Kingdom: CPGBRM (1914:01)
United States: BLS, series ID: CUUR0000SA0, CPI–all urban consumers, U.S. city average,
all items, not seasonally adjusted, 1982-84 = 100 (1913:01–2004:12)
NOTES ABOUT THE FIGURES
We compute all growth rates using log first differencing, unless otherwise noted. For all figures
displaying annual data, if the peak month of a boom occurred in the first six months of a year, we
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it occurred. For figures displaying monthly or quarterly data, we attribute the peak to the actual month
or quarter that it occurred.
Figure 1
Real GDP: Quarterly data were downloaded from the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development) NEQ database of Haver Analytics. Data are available beginning in the quarter
listed in parentheses: Australia (1960:Q1); Canada (1961:Q1); France (1978:Q1); Germany (1991:Q1);
Italy (1980:Q1); Japan (1980:Q1); Netherlands (1977:Q1); Sweden (1980:Q1); United Kingdom (1960:Q1);
United States (1960:Q1). We compute growth rates as year-over-year growth rates for each quarter. We
define the long-run average growth rate as the average growth rate for 1960-2001, calculated using the
annual data from Maddison (2003, Tables 1B, 2B, and 5B).
Figure 2
Labor Productivity: Annual data on GDP per hour worked obtained from the OECD productivity
database (July 2005). The data for all countries span the years 1970-2004. We define the long-run average
growth rate as the average growth rate for 1970-2004.
Figures 3, 8, and 14
Inflation: The sources for consumer price index data are listed above. We compute annual inflation
rates by averaging annualized monthly growth rates. For booms ending prior to 1940, we define the
long-run average growth rate as the average growth rate from the first available observation through
1939 (first available observations: Australia, 1902; Canada, 1911; France, 1872; Germany, 1924; Italy,
1871; Japan, 1871; Netherlands, 1882; Sweden, 1871; United Kingdom, 1871; United States, 1870). For
booms ending after 1940, we define the long-run average growth rate as the average growth rate for
1947-2004.
Figure 4
Short-Term Interest Rate: Except as noted, monthly data on an overnight interest rate were down-
loaded from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database of the International Monetary Fund.
The IFS series identifier and description are listed below. The month of the first available observation
is listed in parentheses.
Australia: C193IM, short-term, weighted average of loans outstanding (1969:07)
Canada: C156IM, money market (MMkt) overnight financing rate (1975:01)
France: C132IM, MMkt opening rate: day-to-day loans against private bills (1965:01)
Germany: C134IM, interbank overnight (1965:01)
Italy: C136IM, 3-month interbank deposits, daily average (1971:01)
Japan: C158IM, Tokyo overnight call money (1965:01)
Netherlands: C138IM, MMkt rate on bankers’ call loans (1965:01–1998:12)
Sweden: C144IM, day-to-day interbank loans (1965:12)
United Kingdom: C112IM, interbank overnight offer rate (1972:01)
United States: C111IM, interbank overnight federal funds (1965:01)
Figure 5
Real Interest Rate: We compute the real short-term interest rate as the difference between the nominal
short-term interest rate and CPI growth in the given month, and we compute CPI growth as the year-over-
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government security yields were downloaded from the IFS database. The IFS series identifier and
description are listed below.
Figure 6
Interest Rate Term Spread: We compute the term spread as the difference between the yields on
long-term government securities and the short-term interest rate used to construct Figure 4. Monthly
data on government security yields were downloaded from the IFS database. The IFS series identifier
and description are listed below.
Australia: C193IB, 10-year government nonrebate bond yield
Canada: C156IB, 10-or-more-year government bond yield to maturity
France: C132IB, 5-or-more-year government bond yield to maturity
Germany: C134IB, 3-or-more-year government & agency bond yield, weighted average
Italy: C136IB, 9-to-10-year government bond yield
Japan: C158IB, yield to maturity of all ordinary government bonds
Netherlands: C138IB, 10-year government bond yield: most recent bond
Sweden: C144IB, 9-year government bond yield
United Kingdom: C112IB, 20-year government bonds issued at par
United States: C111IB, 10-year government bond yield at constant maturity
Figures 7 and 13
Real GDP: Data are from Maddison (2003, Tables 1B, 2B, and 5B) for 1871-2001 and the OECD for
2001-04. For booms ending prior to 1940, we define the long-run average growth rate as the average
growth rate for 1871-1939. For booms ending after 1940, we define the long-run average growth rate as
the average growth rate for 1960-2001.
Figures 9 and 10
Commercial Paper Interest Rate: Monthly data were obtained from Global Financial Data, except as
noted. There are no data for Australia, Canada, or Germany for the prewar period, and hence the medians
plotted in the figure exclude these countries. The following lists the Global Financial Data series iden-
tifier and description for each country. Data availability is listed in parentheses.
France: IPFRAW, private discount rate (1922:01–1940:06)
Italy: IPITAW, private discount rate (1922:01–1939:09)
Japan: IPJPN3D, private bills 3-month discount rate (1900:01–1945:06)
Netherlands: IPNLDW, private discount rate/advances (1919:01–1940:05)
Sweden: IPSWEW, private discount rate (1926:01–1941:12)
United Kingdom: IPGBR3D, U.K. private discount rate (1900:01–2004:12)
United States: U.S. commercial paper interest rate (4- to 6-month), Federal Reserve Board,
Banking and Monetary Statistics (1943, Table 120, pp. 450-51) (1919:01–1941:12)
Figures 11 and 17
Money Stock: Except as noted below, our data are for a broad money stock measure and come from
Bordo et al. (2001, Appendix A). Recent data, which we obtained from Haver Analytics, are from the
OECD. Data for euro area countries end in 1998. We do not include these countries in the calculation
of median growth rates after 1998. For booms ending prior to 1940, we define the long-run average
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long-run average growth rate as the average growth rate for 1947-2004.
Australia: Haver Analytics series C193FM3@OECDMEI, M3 (1998-2004)
Canada: Haver Analytics series C156FM1@OECDMEI, M1 (1996-2004)
France: Haver Analytics series C132FM3@OECDMEI, M3 (1990-1998)
Germany: Haver Analytics series C134FM2@OECDMEI, M2 (1990-1998)
Italy: Haver Analytics series C136FM2@OECDMEI, M2 (1996-1998)
Japan: Haver Analytics series C158FM2@OECDMEI, M2 + CDs (1998-2004)
Netherlands: Haver Analytics series C138FM3N@OECDMEI, M3 (1990-1998)
Sweden: Haver Analytics series C144FM3N@OECDMEI, M3 (1996-2004)
United Kingdom: Haver Analytics series C112FM4@OECDMEI, M4 (1998-2004)
United States: Friedman and Schwartz (1963, Table A1, column 8) (1882-1959);
Haver Analytics series C111FM2@OECDMEI, M2 (1960-2004)
Figures 12 and 18
Real Money Stock: We compute real money stock growth as the difference between the growth rates
of the nominal money stock and consumer price index. For booms ending prior to 1940, we define the
long-run average growth rate as the average growth rate from the first available observation through 1939
(first available observations: Australia, 1902; Canada, 1911; France, 1881; Germany, 1926; Italy, 1881;
Japan, 1881; Netherlands, 1882; Sweden, 1881; United Kingdom, 1881; United States, 1881). For booms
ending after 1940, we define the long-run average growth rate as the average growth rate for 1947-2004.
Figures 15 and 16
Short-Term Interest Rate: Except as noted, monthly data on an overnight interest rate and/or
Treasury bill rate were obtained from Global Financial Data. The following lists the Global Financial
Data series identifier and description for each country. Data availability is listed in parentheses.
Australia: ITAUS3D, 3-month T-bill yield (1928:07–2004:12)
Canada: ITCAN3D, 3-month T-bill yield (1934:03–1956:12); IMCAND,
overnight MMkt rate (1957:01–2004:12)
France: ITFRA3D, 3-month T-bill yield (1931:01–1936:04; 2002:01–2004:12);
IMFRAD, call money rate (1936:05–2001:12)
Germany: ITDEUM, 3-month T-bill yield (1953:01–1954:02; 2002:01–2004:12);
IMDEUD, call money rate (1954:03–2001:12)
Italy: ITITA3M, 3-month T-bill yield (1946:04–1978:05; 2002:01–2004:12);
IMITAD, interbank overnight rate (1978:06–2001:12)
Japan: IMJPND, overnight lending rate (1949:01–2004:12)
Netherlands: IMNLDD, overnight interbank rate (1929:01–2001:12);
ITNLDD, 3-month T-bill yield (2002:01–2004:12)
Sweden: ITSWE3D, 3-month T-bill yield (1955:01–1965:07);
IMSWED, overnight interbank rate (1965:08–2004:12)
United Kingdom: IMGBRD, overnight interbank rate (1945:12–2004:12)
United States: ITUSA3SD, 90-day T-bill secondary market (1920:01–1954:06);
overnight federal funds rate, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FREDII database
(1954:07–2004:12)
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